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NOTES
THE INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE IN THE LIFE INSURANCE PoLIcY-There has
been a growing tendency in recent years toward liberalization of the life insur-
ance contract,' and with this, the incontestable clause has grown in importance.
Most powerful of the reasons for such a movement is doubtless the desire of
benficiaries, creditors, and policyholders for certainty of the insurer's liability.
The presence of an incontestability provision protects the beneficiary in that
it makes certain the payment to him by the company when the insured has
died. Many years often elapse between the date of the policy's inception
and the time of the insured's passing. The memory of man is short, and
the lapse of a long period of time makes it hard for the true facts attend-
ing the writing of the policy to be ascertained. The insured himself, and
probably many of the witnesses, are unavailable, and an excellent opportunity
is afforded a dishonest or quibbling insurer to avoid payment. The incontestable
clause, an agreement by the insurer that upon the happening of a certain event or
the passage of a certain length of time it will not contest liability on the policy
for any reason not obviously or specifically excepted, gives the beneficiary assur-
ance that he may rely on the insurance protection without fear of intervening
lawsuits or inability to recover because of facts which took place long in the past,
and of which he had no knowledge. The creditors of the insured are likewise
assured that their "collateral" is not subject to sudden disappearance, and the
efficiency of the institution of life insurance in its credit function is thus greatly
increased. Finally, the insured himself is not troubled by doubts as to whether his
beneficiaries will collect promptly or at all. While these factors have made the
incontestable clause a vital element of the life insurance contract from the pur-
chaser's point of view, it must be remembered that the clause redounds to the
benefit of the insurer in enabling it to offer a more readily acceptable contract to
the purchaser.
The Validity of the Clause
Although the incontestable clause has, either by statute or economic neces-
sity, become a universal provision, as yet it by no means enjoys uniform inter-
pretation by the courts. Clauses differ in wording, and the factual situations to
which they may apply are almost countless, but these factors do not account for
all the discrepancies in the judicial interpretation.
See AMRHEiN, THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE LiFE INsuRANCE CONTRACT (1933).
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Where the policy is stated to be incontestable after a certain time, usually
one or two years, the clauses have invariably been held valid and enforceable, and
not contrary to public policy, even when they exclude as a defense the insured's
fraud in the inception of the policy.
2 They are construed not to promote fraud,
3
nor to condone it,4 so long as a reasonable time
5 is allowed the company for
discovery. Where the policy is by its terms incontestable from date and 
fraud
is excepted from the operation of the provision, the clause is valid 
and binding
upon the insurer,6 but where the clause is silent as to fraud, the cases follow 
two
theories. Some courts, unwilling to allow the insured a policy incontestable 
from
date when obtained fraudulently, imply or read into the clause the 
exception of
fraud, though they hold that other defenses are barred.
7  But the majority of
the courts which have faced this issue have held that the clause 
covers fraud, is
valid, and is not contrary to public policy.
8
The clause is often described, inaccurately, as it is self-imposed, 
as a short
statute of limitations,
9 or more properly as a provision recognizing the possibility
of fraud but limiting the time within which the insurer may object.' 
But when-
ever it has been attacked as in conflict with statutes prohibiting 
agreements to
shorten the Statute of Limitations," or prohibiting stipulations 
to exempt anyone
from responsibility for his own fraud,
1 2 it has always been upheld on the ground
that it is merely a waiver of the insured's right to use a 
particular defense. A
more frequent cause for questioning the validity and effect 
of the clause arises
when the policy provision differs from the statutory clause. 
The rule followed
is that the insurer may validly contract to restrict himself 
to a greater degree than
2 Priest v. Kansas City L. Ins. Co., iig Kan. 23, 237 
Pac. 938 (925) ; Murray v. State
M. L. Ins. Co., 22 R. I. 524, 48 Atl. 8oo (igoi) ; Harrison 
v. Provident Relief Ass'n, 141 Va.
659, 126 S. E. 696 (3925).
'American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 156 S. W. 909 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1913).
'Powell v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 313 Ill. 161, 144 N. 
E. 825 (i94) ; Stratton v. Service
L. Ins. Co., 117 Neb. 685, 222 N. W. 332 (1928) ; Metropolitan 
L. Ins. Co. v. Peeler, 71 Okla.
238, 176 Pac. 939 (1918) ; Lawler v. Home L. Ins. Co., 59 Pa. 
Super. 409 (1915).
'Two years: Powell v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra note 4; Link 
v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 234
Ill. App. 250 (1924) ; Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
v. Whitehead, 123 Ky. 21, 93 S. W. 6o
(i9o6) ; Killian v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 251 N. 
Y. 44, 166 N. E. 798 (1929). One year:
Great Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Russ, 14 F. (2d) 
27 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Missouri St. L. Ins.
Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257 S. W. 66 (1923) 
; Dibble v. Reliance L. Ins. Co., 170 Cal.
199, 149 Pac. 171 (1915); Ramsay v. Old 
Colony L. Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 
1O8
(192i) ; Harris v. Security L. Ins. Co., 248 Mo. 304, 
154 S. W. 68 (1913) ; Reliance L. Ins.
Co. v. Thayer, 84 Okla. 238, 2o3 Pac. 19o (1922) ; Kansas 
L. Ins. Co. v. Truscott, 47 S. W.
(2d) 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
Independent L. Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 222 
Ala. 34, 130 So. 402 (ig3o) ; Peoria Life 
Ass'n
v. Hines, 132 Ill. App. 642 (19o7).
I The law will impliedly except fraud as a defense. 
New York L. Ins. Co. v. Weaver,
114 Ky. 295, 70 S. W. 628 (i9o2) ; Reagan 
v. Union M. L. Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 
N. E.
217 (1905). In Welch v. Union Central L. 
Ins. Co., 1O8 Iowa 224, 78 N. W. 853 (I899), 
the
court held that the answers in the insured's application 
would be given no effect if fraud as a
defense were barred. It would seem, therefore, 
that the parties intended to except fraud from
the clause.
' Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Strange, 223 Ala. 226, 
135 So. 477 (93) (health policy);
Duvall v. National Ins. Co. of Mont., 28 Idaho 
356, 154 Pac. 632 (1916) ; McKendree v.
Southern S. L. Ins. Co., 112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E. 8o6 
(1919) ; Insurance Co. v. Fox, io6 Tenn.347, 61 S. W. 62 (1901).
Missouri St. L. Ins. Co. v. Cranford, supra note 
5; Powell v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra
note 4.
n 4Flanigan v. Federal L. Ins. Co., 231 Ill. 399, 83 
N. E. 178 (19o7) ; Murray v. State
M. L. Ins. Co., supra note 2.
"Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Strange, sitpra note 
8; Priest v. Kansas City L. Ins. Co.,
supra note 2; Citizens L. Ins. Co. v. McClure, 
138 Ky. 138, 127 S. W. 749 (igio) ; Metro-
politan L. Ins. Co. v. Peeler, snpra note 4.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Peeler, supra note 4.
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required, by -waiving the statutory privileges, but he may not exceed its limita-
tions.13 The clause will be enforced according to its terms when the period is
shorter or more restrictive than the statute,14 or when it does not include statutory
exceptions,", but the insured will be given the statutory rights when the clause is




A prolific source of litigation is the problem of what constitutes a "contest"
within the meaning of the clause and when such a contest is made. The great
majority of jurisdictions hold that legal action is necessary, either by a bill in
equity to cancel the policy, or by a defense to suit thereon.' 9 The only recognized
exception to this majority rule is a valid release from the insured or his bene-
ficiary to the insurer.2 0 Neither an offer of rescission with tender of premiums,
nor a mere notice of cancellation without the insured's consent, nor a refusal for
cause to pay the beneficiary is a contest, so as to stop the running of the clause.2
11 Beard v. North St. L. Ins. Co., 1o4 S. C. 45, 88 S. E. 285 (igi6).
" Duvall v. National Ins. Co., supra note 8; Ramsay v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co., supra
note 5; Citizens L. Ins. Co. v. McClure, supra note ii; Stratton v. Service L. Ins. Co., supra
note 4; Philadelphia L. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, g7 S. C. 418, 81 St E. 964 (I913) ; Thistle v.
Equitable L. A. Soc., 149 Tenn. 667, 261 S. W. 667 (1924).
'Arnold v. Equitable L. A. SoC., 228 Fed. x57 (S. D. Iowa 1915) (adjustment for mis-
statement of age).
"American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Welsh, 3 S. W. (2d) 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (statute
set 2-year period; clause set 2 years within lifetime of insured). In Kocak v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co., 144 Misc. 42, 258 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1932), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 780, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 283 (1933), the clause was of the 2-year "in force" type. At the time the policy was
written the statute set a 2-year period, but the statute was later amended to a 2-year lifetime
provision. The court enforced the clause as it would have been enforced when the policy was
written.
'7 Clauses excepted fraud: Beard v. North St. L. Ins. Co., supra note 13; American Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Tabor, iii Tex. 155, 230 S. W. 397 (I921).
" Link v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra note 5. The clause read "z years from date of is-
sue", while the statute was "2 years from date". Policy was dated prior to the date of issue,
so clause ran from the policy date.
"Chun Ngit Ngan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 9 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Powell
v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra note 4; Repala v. John Hancock M. L. Ins. Co., 229 Mich. 463,
2O N. W. 465 (924) ; American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 558, go S. E. 7o6
(1917) ; Thistle v. Equitable L. A. Soc., supra note I4. Contra: Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hurni
Packing Co., 280 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922), aff'd, 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 9o
(1923), to the effect that a refusal to pay for cause is a sufficient act of contest; Steigler v.
Eureka L. Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, I27 Atl. 397 (1925), that the company may, at its option,
rescind for cause by any definite word or act, so long as it does not unreasonably delay;
Feierman v. Eureka L. Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 507, 124 AtI. 171 (1924), that the company must at
least disavow liability within the period, not necessarily by legal action, but by some definite
step specifying the ground of complaint.
"I Eichwedel v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 216 Mo. App. 452, 270 S. W. 415 (1925) ; Tel-
ford v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 223 App. Div. 175, 228 N. Y. Supp. 54 (1928), af'd, 250
N. Y. 528, I66 N. E. 311 (1928); see Mack v. Conn. Gen. L. Wens. Co., 12 F. (2d) 46 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1926); Rose v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., ig F. (2d) 28o (C. C. A. 6th, I927);
cf. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 39 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 5th, I93O), where accept-
ance of a premium refund by the beneficiary did not suspend the clause as there was
no proof that the company was misled to think payment would not be demanded; Indiana
Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9, ioi N. E. 289 (1913), where a release, made by
insured, was held invalid because made without the consent o~f the beneficiary, even though the
beneficiary could have been changed by the insured at any time; Killian v. Metropolitan L.
Ins. Co., sapra note 5, where a release given by a mother was held invalid as to her four,
minor children.
'Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 294 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; New York
L. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 2o2 Ind. 493, 176 N. E. 146 (ig3i) ; Gorski v. Metropolitan L. Ins.
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The contest, whether it be by action to cancel or by defense to a suit, must
be made within the period of contestability as stated in the policy. The company
must file its bill or answer before the period expires. The fact that the beneficiary
has started suit before the policy becomes incontestable does not suspend the
running of the clause, and the company's answer, if entered after the expiration
of the period, does not relate back to the start of the action.22 But if the company
"contests" within the period, it may perfect its pleas by amendment after the
expiration of the time for contest.23
The Period of Contestability
Whenever the date from which the incontestable clause is to run is ambiguous,
the courts resolve the doubt in favor of the insured or the beneficiary, following
the rule that ambiguous terms in the policy will be construed strictly against the
insurer. Thus where the date stated in the policy varies from the statutory date,2"
the earlier one will be given effect, 25 and a period "from date of issue" is often
held to mean "from policy date".26 Also, where the insured's policy with one
company is reinsured or taken over and assumed by a successor, the original
policy clause is enforced as of its own date.27 When the policy proper is preceded
by short-term insurance, interim certificates, or binding slips, to give effect to the
insurance before the policy is issued, the clause runs from the date of the certifi-
cates,28 notwithstanding the fact that the clause may read "from date of policy";
and a rider issued subsequently to the policy, but specifying that it is part of the
original contract, is covered by the original clause as of the policy date."6
When the insured dies within the contestable period, a construction of the
wording of the clause is necessary to determine whether the clause continues to
run against the insurer and in favor of the beneficiary. When the clause is one
of the stated period type such as "I year after date" or "2 years after date", the
Co., 88 Pa. Super. 326 (1926), where it was held that an offer of rescission was not a declara-
tion that the company was no longer bound within the language of the Feierman case, supra.
note i; Humpston v. State M. L. A. Co., 148 Tenn. 439, 256 S. W. 438 (1923).
Missouri St. L. Ins. Co. v. Cranford, supra note 5; Wolpin v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
223 App. Div. 339, 228 N. Y. Supp. 78 (1928).
I Scharlach v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co., 9 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) ; see Joseph v.
New York L. Ins. Co., 308 Ill. 93, 139 N. E. 32 (1923) ; cf. Becker, v. Illinois L. Ins. Co.,
227 Mich. 388, 198 N. W. 884 0924), where an amended plea was held not to be a defense
because it was the first notice to the beneficiary of a contest for fraud, and was not entered
until more than a year from the expiration of the contestable period; Tracy L. & T. Co. v.
Mutual L. Ins. Co., 79 Utah 33, 7 P. (2d) 279 (1932), where a plea filed in a court later de-
clared to have no jurisdiction was no contest, and did not suspend the running of the clause.
21 The dates from which the statutes state the clause shall run vary, but the most common
are the date of the policy, the date of issue, or the effective date of insurance.
Link v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra note 5.
' Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 9o (1923) (where
policy antedated) ; Great Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Russ, supra note 5; Monahan v. Fidelity
M. L. Ins. Co., 242 Ill. 488, 90 N. E. 213 (19o9) ; Meridian L. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 172 Ky. 75,
188 S. W. 879 (1916). Contra: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Connallon, io8 N. J. Eq. 316, 154 Atl.
729 (1931), rev'g io6 N. J. Eq. 251, 150 Atl. 564 (0930). In the Monahan case, the clause
read "after policy shall be in continuous force 2 years". The policy also provided that it
should not be in force until the first premium had been paid, but the court held that the clause
ran from the policy date, rather than the date of the first premium payment.
"Arrowsmith v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co., 164 Ill. App. 44 (1911); Bethke v. Cosmo-
politan L. Ins. Co., 262 Ill. App. 586 (1931) ; Wood v. Cosmopolitan L. Ins. Co., 266 Ill. App.
556 (1932).
2 Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 26o Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ; Schwartz v.
Northern L. Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928), rezlg 19 F. (2d) 142 (N. D. Cal.
1927), certiorari denied, 278 U. S. 628, 49 Sup. Ct. 29 (1928) ; American Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, I86 S. W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
9 Wamboldt v. Reserve L. L. Ins. Co., 191 N. C. 32, 131 S. E. 395 (1926).
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great majority hold that it continues to run,30 and if the period elapses before
a "contest" by the insurer, the policy becomes incontestable. But where the
clause is of the "i year after date and within the lifetime of the insured"
type, the insured must survive the period. If he dies before its expiration,
the rights of the parties are fixed by his death, and the policy cannot there-
after become incontestable. 31 A few clauses are worded "after 2 years in force",
and these are usually given the same effect as the "lifetime" clauses, as the courts
declare a policy not to be in force after the insured dies. -3 2 In Minnesota, clauses
of whatever type are held not to survive the death of the insured and the rights
of the parties become fixed upon the happening of that event.33
Where the clause is of the stated period type and is held to run after the
death of the insured, it may be within the power of the beneficiary to refrain
from bringing suit until after the period has expired, thus barring any defense
which the cormpany might have had at the time of the insured's death. The com-
pany has no adequate remedy at law, because the possibility of defense would
depend upon its opponent bringing suit within the period. Equitable jurisdiction
to cancel follows.34 Where the clause is of the "lifetime" type or the "period in
force" type, and is held not to run after the insured's death, so that the rights of
the parties are fixed, the company has an adequate remedy at law since it can
defend no matter when the beneficiary may sue.85 The Minnesota courts, follow-
ing their rule that the clause never runs after the death of the insured, conse-
quently hold that equity never has jurisdiction to cancel. 36
I Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., supra note 26; New York L. Ins. Co. v.
Rigas, 117 Conn. 437, 168 AtI. 22 (1933) ; Monahan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 283 Ill. 136,
iIg N. E. 68 (1918) ; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 328 Mo. 876, 42 S. W. (2d)' 584 (ig3i) ;
New York L. Ins. Co. v. Steinman, io3 N. J. Eq 403, 143 AtI. 529 (1928) ; see Jensen v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 336, 167 N. E. 462 (1929), rez'g 225 App. Div. 834, 232
N. Y. Supp. 779 (1929).
' Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 31 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 8th, i929); Greenbaum v.
Columbian Nat. L. Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; see Chicago Nat. L. Ins.
Co. v. Carbaugh, 337 11. 483, 169 N. E. 218 (1929).
'Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co. v. Smith, I5 Ark. 499, 248 S. W. 897 (1923) ; Thomas v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 135 Kan. 381, 1o P. (2d): 864 (1932). Contra: Jefferson St. L.
Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 294 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923), reZ/g 285 Fed. 570 (S. D. Fla.
1922). At the time of the decision in the Hurni case, supra note 26, the District Court had
decided Jefferson v. McIntyre. In its opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished the clause
involved ,from those in the McIntyre and Smith cases, and therefore its decision was con-
trary. But when the McIntyre case was reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, this dis-
tinction was ignored and the Hurni case followed.
I Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 157 Minn. 253, 195 N. W. 913 (1923). Contra: Mutual
L. Ins. Co. v. Conley, 55 F. (2d) 42i (D. Minn. 1932). The federal court held that the
question was one of general jurisprudence and therefore it was not bound to follow the Min-
nesota rule.
Bankers' L. Co. v. Guzan, 2 F. Supp. 35 (W. D. Pa. 1932) ; Newi York L. Ins. Co.
v. Rigas, supra note 30; see Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, supra note 3o (the company must
allege that the beneficiary has not brought suit at law). It is also the majority rule that
when the company has once commenced an equitable action, wherein equity has jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction cannot be displaced by a subsequent action at law by the beneficiary. Peake
v. Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co., 15 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Keystone Dairy Co. v.
New York L. Ins. Co., ig F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; cf. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Hurt,
35 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (decided on special facts); New York L. Ins. Co.
v. McCarthy, 22 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 5th, i927) (equitable action maintainable but un-
necessary).neAetna L. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy; Chicago Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Carbaugh, both supra note
31.
. Indianapolis L. Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 158 Minn. 359, 197 N. W. 757 (1924) ; Northwest-
ern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Laury, 174 Minn. 498, 219 N. W. 759 (1928). Contra: Mutual L. Ins.
Co. v. Conley, supra note 33.
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If the company fails to contest the policy within the period allowed, it be-
comes incontestable according to its terms immediately.3 7  Payment of the next
succeeding premium is not essential to make the policy incontestable as of the end
of the preceding year, so that if the insured dies within the period of grace with-
out having remitted his second annual premium, a one year after date clause has
expired and the policy is incontestable.38
Where a beneficiary is named by the policy and the insured dies within the
period of contestability, the company may bring action to cancel against the
beneficiary, so the clause is not suspended pending the appointment of an executor
or administrator,8 but where no beneficiary is named or the policy is payable to
the insured's estate, his death leaves no one against whom the action to cancel will
lie. In such a case, the clause is suspended until the administrator is appointed,
and begins to run again against the company as soon as a party is available.40
Defenses Available to the Insurer After the Incontestable Clause Has Run
The cases commonly express the rule of law that "the clause covers all
defenses not specifically excepted". 4 It is unfortunate that the language used is
so broad because it has been the source of several misconceptions, chief among
which is the failure to distinguish between conditions and excepted risks.42 Nor
is the language quoted strictly accurate since the law often implies the exception
of fraud 43 in policies incontestable from date, and non-payment of premiums and
abandonment of the contract are implied exceptions to an otherwise silent clause.4"
However, since the exceptions may be anything that the statute permits, the clause
either covers the questions raised, or specifically excepts them, in the great
majority of cases. The common provisions excluding from the operation of the
clause military and naval service in time of war, 5 total and permanent disability
and double indemnity riders,46 and adjustment for misstatement of age,4 7 are the
' The clause is not extended by the provisions of a practice act allowing a defendant 20
days in which to answer. Whether the beneficiary starts suit within 2o days of the expira-
tion of the period or not, the company must contest by defense or action within the period.
Wolpin v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra note 22.
' Fairfield v. Union L. Ins. Co., 196 Ill. App. 7 (9,5) ; Young v. Union L. Ins. Co., 2o2
Ill. App. 321 (ii6). Policies customarily provide that the insured shall have 3o days' grace
in which to pay his premium, before the policy shall lapse.
' Chun Ngit Ngan v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra note ig; Link v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.,
supra note 5.
' See Ramsay v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co., supra note 5; Jensen v. Metropolitan L. Ins.
Co., supra note 3o. But where the company did not learn of the insured's fraud until after
the executor was appointed, no time allowance will be made because the company could not
possibly have sued to cancel. Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Pickering, 293 Fed. 496 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1923), certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 72o, 44 Sup. Ct. 229 (1924).
I Wamboldt v. Federal L. L. Ins. Co., supra note 29; Plotner v. Northwestern Nat. L.
Ins. Co., 48 N. D. 295, 183 N. W. IooO (1921) ; United Sec. L. Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Massey, 159
Va. 832, 167 S. E. 248 (933) ; Millis v. Continental L. Ins. Co., 162 Wash. 555, 298 Pac.
739 (1931).
See infra notes 56 and 57.
See supra note 7.
"Haas v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 9o Neb. 8o8, 134 N. W. 937 (1912).
American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 226 S. W. 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o).
"Penn Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hartle, 166 Atl. 614 (Md. 1933) ; Chambers v. New York
L. Ins. Co., 148 Misc. 561, 265 N. Y. Supp. 217 (933); Millis v. Continental L. Ins. Co.,
supra note 41.
'In Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 51 So. 61 (IgIO), the misstatement of age
provision was not incorporated in the incontestable clause but in a separate clause which the
court held was controlled by the incontestable clause, thus limiting the insurer's right to con-
test for this reason to the contestable period. But in Taylor v. Unity Industrial Ins. Co.,
147 So. gi (La. App. 1933), the court stated that the age adjustment provision was not to be
controlled by the incontestable clause. However, the company had failed to get its objection
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most frequently used exceptions, while practically every clause in use at present
precludes, upon the expiration of the contestable period, the defenses that the
policy never took effect or was invalid in its inception because of fraud,48 or lack
of good health on the part of the insured at the time the policy was delivered. 49
There are, however, a number of defenses, available to the company in spite
of the expiration of the contestable period, which are not exceptions. For exam-
ple, it is well settled that a dispute by the insurer of the amount due, rather than
the validity of the policy, does not come within the operation of the clause,5 ° and
the company is not precluded from showing that the beneficiary has not sued
within the time allowed by the policy,5 ' nor from setting up clerical errors in the
policy where the insured had knowledge that such errors existed, 2 nor from
denying that insurance was ever written on the insured's life because of a sub-
stitution during the medical examination.5" It has been held that the clause does
not run to protect a stranger to the contract,54 but, on the other hand, an assignee
of the insured, misled by the terms of the policy, has been allowed to recover over
the defense of fraud even though the period had not yet expired.5
Most of the remaining cases enabling the insurer to avoid liability despite
the incontestable clause fall into two classes: those holding valid a limitation on
the coverage or risk assumed by the insurer, and those declaring a public policy
against recovery under the particular facts of the case. In the first group there
is much confusion resulting from a failure to distinguish between a limitation on
the risk assumed by the company and a breach by the insured of a condition sub-
sequent in the policy. The former is illustrated by a policy provision that the
company will not be liable if the insured dies under certain circumstances, such
as while flying, or by suicide, or while engaged in a prohibited occupation. If the
insured dies while engaged in such a pursuit, the insurer is not liable whether
properly on the record. In Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 238, 234 N., Y. Supp.
278 (1928), adjustment was permitted. The principal Pennsylvania cases are Sipp v. Phila-
delphia L. Ins. Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 At. 221 (1928) ; Central Trust Co. v. Fidelity M. L.
Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 313 (i9I); Mitchell v. Pennsylvania M. L. Ins. Co., 9o Pa. Super.
426 (927).
' Southern U. L. Ins. Co. v. White, i88 S. W. 266 (Tex. Civ. App. igi6).
"9Hurt v. New York L. Ins. Co., 5I F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. ioth, i93i) ; Kanter v. Con-
tinental A. Co., 251 Ill. App. 272 (1929) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Connallon, supra note 26;
Mohr v. Prudential Ins. Co., 32 R. I. 177, 78 Atl. 554 (91I). In Independent L. Ins. Co.
v. Carroll, supra note 6, this defense was held covered because the company did not allege it
to be "actual and intended fraud" within an exception to the clause.
I' Sanders v. Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co., io F. (2d) 143 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) (double in-
demnity); Columbian Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. ioth, 1929)
(printer's error) ; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 47 (adjustment for misstate-
ment of age) ; Sipp v. Philadelphia L. Ins. Co., supra note 47 (adjustment for misstatement
of age) ; Buck v. Equitable L. A. Soc., 96 Wash. 683, i65 Pac. 878 (x917) (printer's error) ;
cf. Mitchell v. Pennsylvania M. L. Ins. Co., szapra note 47, where the company, instead of ad-
mitting liability on a policy wherein the insured had, misstated his age, and offering to pay
the correct amount, denied all liability on the ground that it did not write risks of that age.
This defense was held barred, and the beneficiary recovered the face amount.
I Illinois Bankers' L. Ass'n v. Byasse, i6g Ark. 230, 275 S. W. 519 (I9"25) ; Brady v.
Prudential Ins. Co., i68 Pa. 645, 32 Atl. ioz (1895).
Columbian Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Black; Buck v. Equitable L. A. Soc., both supra note 50.
0 Maslin v. Columbian Nat. L. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 368 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
"Prudential Ins. Co. v. Mohr, i85 Fed. 936 (D. R. I. igii). In Mohr v. Prudential Ins.
Co., supra note 49, the beneficiary recovered on a policy fraudulently obtained by conspirators,
because the incontestable clause had run. Here the company sought to recover from one of
the conspirators in an action of fraud and deceit. The court held that the running of the
clause was no defense to such a party.
m State M. L. Ins. Co. v. Rosenberry, 175 S. W. 757 (Tex. Civ. App. ig5). It did not
appear on the face of the policy that there had been a default and reinstatement.
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the incontestable clause has run or not. 6 The latter is illustrated by a provision
that the policy shall be "void" if the insured engages in the forbidden pursuit.
This purports to relieve the insurer whether or not the insured dies as a result of
the forbidden conduct, i. e., the clause is not a limitation of the risk, but a matter
of defense, and so is barred by the running of the clause."r
The cases allowing the insurer a defense based on public policy fall into two
main classes. No recovery may be had on a policy which does not meet the require-
ments of the law with regard to insurable interest,51 because the contract is a
wager and invalid, and the incontestable clause does not serve to validate it. The
clause, being part of the policy, falls with the whole.59 The second group of cases
under the public policy defenses covers those situations wherein recovery is sought
for the death of the insured by his own criminal act, or at the hands of justice,
whether there is a policy provision excluding such deaths from the risk assumed
or not.
In 183o the House of Lords, in The Amicable Society v. Bolland0 ° held that
there can be no recovery on a life insurance policy when the insured is executed
for felony; that public policy so forbids. The court developed the theory that,
since the policy would be void if the insurance were written specifically to protect
against death by execution, to allow recovery would be to insert by implication a
clause which would, if expressed, render the policy void. The Bolland case has
been followed in the United States by the Supreme Court,61 on the theory that
' Sanders v. Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co., szpra note 50 (injuries intentionally inflicted by a
third person) ; Flannagan v. Provident L. & A. Ins. Co., 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927)
(injuries received in driving while drunk) ; Wright v. Philadelphia L. Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d)
514 (E. D. S. C. 1927) (suicide) ; Head v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 43 F. (2d) 517 (C.
C. A. loth, 193o) (aerial navigation). The incontestable clause is not a mandate as to cover-
age, and the exceptions to the clause do not militate against this construction. Lee v. South-
ern L. & H. Ins. Co., ig Ala. App. 535, 98 So. 696 (1924) (death by malicious act of bene-
ficiary) ; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (193o) (aerial
navigation) ; McCreighton v. American Cath. U., 71 Pa. Super. 332 (1919) (death in con-
sequence of an immoral act-abortion). Contra: Philadelphia L. Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 18 F.
(2d) 599 (E. D. S. C. 1927) (suicide) ; Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Robbs, 177 Ark. 275, 6 S. W.
(2d) 520 (1928) (suicide); Sun L. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, io8 Ky. 408, 56 S. W. 668 (igoo)
(death as the result of the insured's own criminal act) ; Bernier v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co., 173
La. 1O78, 139 So. 629 (1932) (aerial navigation). The court was influenced by the fact that
the incontestable clause named certain exceptions. It held that this fact showed an intent to
exclude all others. The Phila. v. Burgess, Standard Life v. Robbs, Sun Life v. Taylor, and
Bernier cases are clearly incorrect holdings. The company's risk is also often limited to the
results of disease or accident striking after the insurance comes into force, and there is then
no liability, though the contestable period may have expired, for results caused by disease or
accident occurring before the insurance attached. John Hancock M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hicks,
43 Ohio App. 242, 183 N. E. 93 (i93I); Barnes v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 7 S. W. (2d) 946 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928). Contra: Kansas City L. Ins. Co. v. Hislip, 154 Okla. 42, 6 P. (2d) 678
(1932).
7 United Sec. L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Massey, supra note 41; see Head v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., supra note 56; Jolley v. Jefferson St. L. Ins. Co., ig N. C. 269, 154 S. E. 400
(193o).
'Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Hooker, 62 F. (2d) 8o5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) ; Home L. Ins. Co.
v. Masterson, i8o Ark. 170, 21 S. W. (2d) 414 (1929) ; People v. Alexander, 183 App. Div.
868, 171 N. Y. Supp. 881 (i9i8), aff'd, 225 N. Y. 717, 122 N. E. 887 (1919) ; Logan v. Texas
M. L. Ins. Ass'n, 51 S. W. (2d) 288 (Comm. App. Tex. 1932). Contra: Bogacki v. Great
W. L. A. Co., 253 Mich. 253, 234 N. W. 865 (1931). The court held that a statute except-
ing from the operation o f the clause only military and naval service declared the state's public
policy, and that therefore the clause ran on this defense and the policy became incontestable.
' Bromley's Adm'r v. Washington L. Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 402, 92 S. W. 17 (1906).Go 4 Bligh N. R. 194 (183o).
" Burt v. Union C. L. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Sup. Ct. 139 (192) ; Northwestern M.
L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220 (1912). In the latter case the court
construed a Virginia contract, applying Virginia public policy, with which it agreed.
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there is an implied condition in every policy that the insured will do nothing to
accelerate wrongfully the maturity of the contract, and that public policy forbids
the insertion of a condition that would tend to induce crime.62 A few of the states
follow this line of decisions either on the ground that an express provision would
be void, and that where there is no such stipulation, such a death could not have
been within the contemplation of the parties,63 or upon the theory that a denial
of recovery will deter crime.6
The opposite result has been reached in other jurisdictions. In one state the
court repudiated decisions to the contrary, holding that the fact that an express
provision would void the policy has no effect upon a policy silent in respect to
this circumstance, and answering the objection that the parties did not contem-
plate such an assumption of risk by holding that there is nothing to show that the
company intended to exclude it.65 Another court has allowed recovery for the
death of the insured in consequence of a criminal act, on the unsound ground
that the incontestable clause covered a risk excluded by the policy," and yet
another has stated that its public policy is "conclusively evidenced by its constitu-
tion and statutes prohibiting forfeiture for conviction of crime", and the contract
is enforceable.6 7 The last court distinguished the Bolland case on the ground that
at the time of the English decision, the forfeiture laws of England had not yet
been repealed.6 s A Tennessee decision,69 also distinguishing the Bolland case,
expressed surprise that none of the American cases denying recovery had dis-
cussed the fact that American law has never countenanced forfeitures. This last
argument may be answered, as it has been in Pennsylvania,"0 by pointing out that
though the court is powerless to work forfeiture where an heir murders his intes-
tate, it may still refuse to aid recovery where an "abuse of contract rights
appears". However, if this latter ground is the only justification for those deci-
sions denying recovery on the policy, it would seem better to permit recovery,
thus avoiding hardship to innocent parties, and strengthening the credit function
of the policy.
Riders and Supplemental Contracts
Often when riders or supplemental contracts are attached to the policy, the
question arises whether they are controlled by the incontestable clause in the policy
proper. The clause in the original policy will not affect the, supplemental contract
13 It is obviously absurd to consider this rule of law a deterrent to crime. If the insured
is willing to risk the death penalty, there are few cases indeed where he will desist from his
crime because his insurance would thereby be void.
Scarborough v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482 (1916).
, Collins v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 27 Pa. Super. 353 (19o5) ; cf. Patterson v. Natural
P. M. L. Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 98o (1898), where the court held that it was not
against public policy to allow recovery for suicide of the insured, and a policy provision ex-
cluding the risk of insured's death in violation of law must be limited to violations of law for
which there is a punishment.
w Weeks v. New York L. Ins. Co., 128 S. C. 121, 122 S. E. 586 (1924). Georgia has no
public policy against recovery, Murphy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 152 Ga. 393, 110 S. E.
178 (1921), answer to certified question conformed to 28 Ga. App. 71, iid S. E. 311 (1922).
And Texas holds that to deny recovery "the court is required to find a long lasting malice".
American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coates, 112 Tex. 267, 246 S. W. 356 (1923).
Sun L. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, supra note 56.
* Collins v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1908).
The acts of 33 & 34 VICM., c. 23, abolishing forfeiture for felony, were not passed until
1870.
' Fields v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249 S. W. 798 (923).
', Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 2o3, 32 AtI. 637 (1895). In compliance with the court's
suggestion, the Assembly legislated Carpenter's Estate out of the law of Pennsylvania so that
a person who murders his intestate is now disqualified from taking as his heir at law. How-
ever, the statute does not affect the point here made.
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when either so specifies,71 but where the riders state that they are part of the
original contract, they are included in the operation of the original clause; 72 and
the same result is held where both clause and rider are silent on this point.73
Reinstatement
Although the courts differ whether reinstatement after a lapse creates a new
contract,7 4 or "revitalizes" the old one7 5 it is usually held that, when the rein-
statement is silent, a period of contestability similar to that of the original policy
begins to run.76  It follows that when the clause has run after reinstatement the
policy is incontestable,7 7 but a minority view refuses to establish any clause limit-
ing the period of contestability, 78 and one court has held that reinstatement is
neither the old nor a new policy, but a contract to restore the old policy, to which
contract the clause is not applicable.
7 9
J. M. H.
PROOF OF PRE-RECEIVERSHIP CLAIMS AND DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIVERSHIP
ASSETS IN PRIMARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTIONs-A corporation has been
placed under the protection of equity; primary and ancillary receivers have been
appointed; corporate property located in the various jurisdictions has been placed
in custodia legis.1 Proofs of claim must now be filed so that claimants may par-
ticipate in the final distribution of the receivership assetsY If the corporation has
engaged in business in many states a number of receivers will have been appointed
and claimants will reside in many different localities. The claimant must at this
point determine the proper jurisdiction in which to file his proof of claim. Shall it
be the jurisdiction in which he resides, the primary jurisdiction, any convenient
one, or every one where receivership proceedings have been instituted? This note
attempts to set forth the limitations of choice, the factors which should be con-
sidered in choosing one jurisdiction or another, and the problems likely to arise
from any particular selection.
A claimant, residing in an ancillary jurisdiction, may, if he chooses,3 present
his petition in that jurisdiction,4 for an unnecessary inconvenience and expense
' Penn Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hartle, swpra note 46 (rider excluded itself from the
operation of the clause) ; Chambers v. New York L. Ins. Co., supra note 46; see Millis v.
Continental L. Ins. Co., supra note 41 (clause excepted disability benefits).
Wamboldt v. Reserve L. L. Ins. Co., supra note 29.
' Kanter v. Continental A. Co., mpra note 49; Kansas City L. Ins. Co. v. Hislip, supra
note 56.
"' New York L. Ins. Co. v. Seymour, 45 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o) ; State L. Ins.
Co. v. Spencer, 62 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Galbraith, 115
Tenn. 471, 91 S. W. 204 (19o).
Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Dreeben, 2o F. (2d) 394 (N. D. Tex. 1927).
" Great Western L. Ins. Co. v. Snavely, 2o6 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) ; Aetna L. Ins.
Co. v. Daniel, supra note 30; Teeter v. United L. Ins. Ass'n, 359 N, Y. 411, 54 N. E. 72
(1899); McCormack v. Security M. L. Ins. Co., 22o N. Y. 447, 116 N. E. 74 (I917), rev'g
161 App. Div. 33, 146 N. Y. Supp. 613 (1914).
' Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Pickering, supra note 40.
'Umans v. New York L. Ins. Co., 259 Mass. 573, I56 N. E. 721 (1927).
'New York L. Ins. Co. v. Feicht, 29 F. (2d) 318 (N. D. Ill. 1928).
1 16 FLETCHER, CoRpoRATiIONs (Perm. ed. 1933) 272.
2-Id. at 542 et seq.
'Some courts, however, will, in the exercise of their discretion, refuse to adjudicate any
proof of claim at all, even of local claimants; but will remit all questions of proof of claim
to the primary court. Superior Cabinet Corp. v. American Piano Co., 39 F. (2d) 87 (D.
Mass. 393o).
4 New York Security & Trust Co. v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 71 Fed. 556 (C. C. W. D.
Mo. 1896) ; Whelan v. Enterprise Transportation Co., 166 Fed. 138 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
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would be imposed by compelling him to proceed to a point remote from his resi-
dence to have the existence and extent of his claim adjudicated. It is therefore
unnecessary that the petition for "allowance" be presented to the court exercising
primary jurisdiction.5
Whether a claimant residing in one ancillary jurisdiction may file his proof
of claim in another ancillary jurisdiction has, as yet, not been conclusively deter-
mined. Although it has been held that such a procedure will not be permitted,
the reason for such objection is not readily apparent. In the closely analogous
field of decedents' estates a claimant residing in one jurisdiction may present his
petition in any other jurisdiction where administrators have been appointed.
7
When it is considered that in presenting a proof of claim a petitioner is asking the
court to acknowledge that he has a claim against the corporation, which gives him
the right to share in the assets 8 in the court's custody, there seems to be no equi-
table reason for refusal.5
In contrast, it has never been contended that a claimant residing in an ancil-
lary jurisdiction may not, if he chooses, present his petition to the court exercising
primary jurisdiction.10 The primary receiver is usually the focal point of the
entire proceedings-he, with the approval of the court which appointed him,
normally determines the proportionate share each claimant will receive and he
makes the final distribution. It is advantageous for the claimant, therefore, to
present his proof of claim to that official and thus be assured of obtaining a proper
share on final distribution of the funds remitted by the ancillary receivers to the
primary court.
Likewise, on the basis of reciprocity, a claimant residing in the primary
jurisdiction may present his proof of claim not only to that court but also to any
other court where receivership proceedings have been instituted." Furthermore,
filing a claim in one jurisdiction is no bar to its subsequent presentation in another
jurisdiction.12 An alert claimant, therefore, presents his claim in every jurisdic-
i9o8); Pfahler v. McCrum-Howell Co., i97 Fed. 684 (E. D. Wis. 1912); Brooks v. Smith,
29o Fed. 33 (C. C. A. Ist, 1923). As to a claimant residing in this country being permitted
to file proof of claim in the ancillary court here, when the primary court is in a foreign
country, see Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 147, x68, 151 N. E. 159,
165 (1926).
I Pfahler v. McCrum, supra note 4; cf. Clark v. Painted Post Lumber Co., 89 N. J. Eq.
409, io4 Atl. 728 (1918) ; see New York Security & Trust Co. v. Equitable Mortgage Co.,
supra note 4, at 558; MacMurray v. Sidwell, 155 Ind. 560, 565, 58 N. E. 722, 724 (9oo).
'Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. R., 65 Fed. 336 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1894) ; cf. Gerding v.
East Tennessee Land Co., 185 Mass. 380, 70 N. E. 206 (19o4). But see Barley v. Gittings,
15 App. D. C. 427, 445 (1899) ; Thornley v. J. C. Walsh Co., 207 Mass. 62, 66, 92 N. E.
1007, ioo8 (1910).
7 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 164 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 8th, igo8) ; Bertram v. Jones,
205 Ky. 69I, 266 S. W. 385 (1924) ; Carroll v. McPike, 53 Miss. 569 (1876) ; In re Hadden,
193 App. Div. gaS, 183 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1920).
a 16 FLErcHERa, op. cit. supra note i, at 61g.
'The recently published draft of thd Co in.lcr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1934) Proposed Final Draft No. 5, § 2060, provides that claimants, regardless of where they
are domiciled, can prove their claims in any jurisdiction in which a receiver has been ap-
pointed.
"'Cowen v. Failey, 149 Ind. 382, 49 N. E. 270 (1898) ; cf. Drury v. Doherty, 131 Misc.
642, 227 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1928) ; It re Phillips (Casualty Co. of America), 206 App. Div.
314, 200 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1923).
"M itchell v. Liberty Clay Products Co., 291 Pa. 282, 139 Atl. 853 (1927) ; Thornley v.
J. C. Walsh Co., supra note 6; I CiAiu, REcEIVRS (2d ed. 1929) 443.
"In re Phillips (Casualty Co. of America), supra note 1o (claimant residing in ancil-
lary jurisdiction had presented claim there and is now permitted to present claim in primary
jurisdiction) ; Mitchell v. Liberty Clay Products Co., supra note ii (claimant residing in
primary jurisdiction had presented claim there and is now permitted to present claim in an-
cillary jurisdiction). Contra: Gerding v. East Tennessee Land Co., supra note 6; cf. Conti-
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tion so that, upon the distribution by the various courts of the funds located in
the different jurisdictions, he will receive his full proportionate share even though
a particular ancillary court refuses to permit its receiver to remit the funds placed
in his custody to the primary jurisdiction.'5
A situation distinct from any discussed thus far arises where a claimant
seeks to reach specific property, as where a constructive trust is sought to be
impressed upon funds in the hands of a receiver, 14 or certain assets are alleged
to have been lawfully attached. 5 In this case, since the claimant is not seeking
recognition of a valid claim against the assets of the corporation as a whole, but
reimbursement out of a particular fund, the court having custody of that fund is
the only one which can properly determine whether such priority should be
accorded.'-
After an ordinary claim has been submitted and "allowed" in one jurisdiction
it is often desirable, as has been seen, that it be filed in another jurisdiction.'
7  Is
the "allowance" of the claim by one court conclusive proof of its validity, so as
to make mandatory its "allowance" by another court exercising jurisdiction over
other property of the same corporation? Although there is no case in receiver-
ship proceedings directly involving this problem, there are dicta indicating that
such recognition will not be given to the "allowance" of a claim by another court.'"
A proper answer necessitates an inquiry into the nature of a receivership pro-
ceeding. A receivership has been said to be a proceeding in rem '" which has for
its res the property in the custody of the court. A claimant is, therefore, merely
asking the court to recognize his right to share in the distribution of the corporate
assets located in that jurisdiction. An adjudication by one court of such right of
participation in the assets in its custody would have no relationship to the right
of the same petitioner to share in the distribution of entirely different assets placed
under the custody of an entirely independent court. In the analogous field of
decedents' estates this view has been adopted by some of the courts 20 while
others 21 have held that the "allowance" of a claim is a
" . judgment . . . against the person of the administrator that
he shall pay the debt of the intestate out of the funds committed to his care.
If there be another administrator in another State, liable to pay the same
debt, he may be subjected to a like judgment upon the same demand, but the
assets in his hands cannot be affected by a judgment to which he is personally
a stranger. A judgment . . . cannot have effect . . . on lands in an-
nental Oil Co. v. American Co-operative Ass'n, 31 Wyo. 433, 228 Pac. 503 (1924). But cf.
Morlan v. Lucev Mfg. Corp., 7 F. (2d) 494 (S. D. Cal. 1925). To the effect that filing
proof of claim in receivership proceedings is no bar to attachment proceedings in a state
where no receiver has been appointed, see Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., 1o6
Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 19O1).
's Supra note 7 and infra note 52.
Beaver Boards Co. v. Imbrie & Co., 282 Fed. 654 (N. D. Ga. 1922).
SFletcher v. Harney Peak Tin-Mining Co., 84 Fed. 555 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 187);
Cohen v. Gold Creek, Nevada, Mining Co., 95 Fed. 58o (C. C. D. Nev. 1899) ; Smith v.
Electric Machinery Co., 83 Pa. Super. 143 (1924).
16 FLErcHER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 620.
'7 Supra note II.
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 1I Sup. Ct. 773 (189o) ; see Whelan v. Enterprise
Transportation Co., supra note 4, at 139; Clark v. Painted Post Lumber Co., supra note 5,
at 425, lO4 Atl. at 731; CON LICT OF LAws RESTA'rmEEN (Am. L. Inst. 1934) Proposed
Final Draft No. 5, § 2o8oA. But see Mitchell v. Liberty Clay Products Co., supra note II,
at 288, 139 Atl. at 854.
16 FLrcHER, op. cit supra note I, at 620.
Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note 7.
2 Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa 11o, 26 N. W. 42 (1885) ; Goodall v. Marshall, ii N. H. 88
(1840).
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other State by virtue of the faith and credit given to it by the Constitution
and act of Congress. The law and courts of a State can only affect persons
and things within its jurisdiction. Consequently, both as to the administrator
and the property confided to him, a judgment in another State is res inter
alios acta. It cannot be even prima facie evidence of a debt; for if it have
any effect at all, it must be as a judgment and operate by way of estoppel." 22
Whichever view is adopted when this problem is presented to the courts in the
field of equity receiverships, the "allowance" by one court is not res adjudicata
when presented to another court. It may be observed further that while a judg-
ment at law may be obtained against an administrator, the appointment of a




However, as the very nature of a receivership makes it imperative that the
various courts work in harmony, one court will, on the basis of comity, accord
recognition of the claims "allowed" in another jurisdiction.24 Despite the almost
universal recognition of another court's "allowance", the conditions imposed upon
remitting 25 the funds collected by the ancillary receiver to the primary court
reveal the inherent fear that the claims presented only in the ancillary court and
"allowed" there only will not be honored upon final distribution.
26
After the petitions have been filed in the various jurisdictions and proofs of
claim have been "allowed" it is sometimes contended by claimants residing in a
particular locality that they should be preferred upon distribution of the corporate
assets located in their jurisdiction over claimants residing elsewhere,2 7 and that
their claims be paid in full before non-resident claimants be permitted to share at
all.28 In some instances local statutes have provided for such a preference.29 In
Blake v. McClung the United States Supreme Court held that "such discrimina-
tion against citizens of other states to be repugnant to the second section of the
fourth article of the Constitution of the United States". 30
This is applicable only to non-resident natural persons as it is settled that the
protection afforded by the "privileges and immunities" clause 31 does not apply to
foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the state, on the ground that
I Stacy v. Thrasher, 47 U. S. 44, 6o (1848). For a comparison of the two theories see
Richards v. Blaisdell, 12 Cal. App. ioi, iii, io6 Pac. 732, 737 (1909).
23 I6 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note I, at 314.
' See dissenting opinion of Parker, C. J., in People v. Granite State Provident Ass'n,
161 N. Y. 492, 498, 55 N. E. 1053, 1055 (19oo).
- Infra notes 50, 53, and 54-
1 See Buswell v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 161 Mass. 224, 36 N. E. io65
(1894) ; Clark v. Painted Post Lumber Co., supra note 5, at 415, 2O4 Atl. at 731; Engineering
Co. v. Perryman Electric Co., 166 Atl. 461, 462 (N. J. Ch. 1933). See generally infra note 47.
'7 Smith v. Taggart, 87 Fed. 94 (C. C. C. A. 8th, 1898) ; Security Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Moore, 150 Ind. 688, 5o N. E. 869 (1898) ; Weedon v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, io9
Ky. 504, 59 S. W. 758 (i9oo) ; Day v. Postal Telegraph Co. of Baltimore, 66 Md. 354, 7 Atl.
6o8 (188 7) ; Ware v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 28 Atl. io41 (N. J. Ch. 1894);
Frowert v. Blank, 2o4 Pa. 368, 54 Atl. i0o (19o3).
'Maynard v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 92 Fed. 435 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899) ; Mac-
Murray v. Sidwell, supra note 5; Thornley v. J. C. Walsh Co., supra note 6.
TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) § 4134. For a good discussion of the power of a
state to prefer local creditors, see Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. iooi.
172 U. S. 239, 254, i9 Sup. Ct. I65, 171 (1898) ; see Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv.
iooi, ioo6; Maynard v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 28; Wilson v. Keels, 54
S. C. 545, 32 S. E. 702 (1899) ; Brunner v. York Bridge Co., 78 W. Va. 702, 9o S. E. 233
(igi6).
' U. S. CoisriTuiio, Article IV, Sec. 2 (1).
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a corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of that provision. 2 Nor is
the corporation deprived of "due process" since no property right is denied the
claimant corporation, the corporation in receivership being admittedly indebted to
the claimant; the latter is denied merely the right to participate upon terms of
equality with local claimants. 33  Nor does such a preference contravene the "equal
protection" clause,3 4 since the foreign corporation is not "within its jurisdiction"."
Furthermore, even if a foreign corporation is licensed to do business in the state
and so is "within its jurisdiction", it will be subordinated to resident natural per-
sons and domestic corporations upon the theory that the claimant when applying
for permission to do business in the state consented to the provisions of the
statute. 6  The almost axiomatic statement that all claimants of like class should
share equally and ratably upon the distribution of the fund realized from the sale
of the corporate assets, 7 makes it unfortunate that the phraseology of the federal
Constitution permits an unfair discrimination in receivership assets should a state
desire to be partial to its residents to the detriment of foreign corporations.
It should be noted that, with respect to non-resident aliens or alien corpora-
tions which have presented claims in receivership proceedings instituted in this
country, there may be discrimination in favor of American citizens or American
corporations, as the federal Constitution affords the former no protection. 8
However, on the basis of comity and the equitable principle that all claimants
should share equally, alien claimants are generally accorded equality upon dis-
tribution.30
The above situation should be distinguished from that which arises when a
corporation, as a condition for entering a state in order to do business therein, is
required by statute to deposit a certain sum for the benefit of claimants resident
in that state.40 It has generally been held, upon the distribution of such a deposit
that resident claimants may be preferred over non-resident natural persons as
3' See Blake v. McClung, supra note 3o, at 259, ig Sup. Ct. at 173. As to local cred-
itors being preferred over foreign corporations under a priority statute in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, see In re Standard Oak Veneer Co., 173 Fed. lO3 (E. D. Tenn. 19o9) ; In re Boggs-
Rice Co., 66 F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
' See Blake v. McClung, supra note 30, at 26o, 19 Sup. Ct. at 173; Note (1929) 77 U. oF
PA. L. REv. OOI, ioo8.
U. S. CoNSrxu To, Amend. XIV, Sec. i.
See Blake v. McClung, supra note 30, at 261, 19 Sup. Ct. at 174; Note (1929) 77 U.
OF PA. L. REV. I00I, 1008.
'But see Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U. S. 445 (1874) (foreign corporation con-
sented, as a condition of entrance into the state to do business therein, that it would not re-
move any litigation to the federal courts), where it was held that a state could not impose
conditions repugnant to the federal Constitution.
'Fry v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 197, 200 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1887) ; Par-
sons v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 305 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1887) ; see Maynard v.
Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 28; Wilson v. Keels; Brunner v. York Bridge
Co., both supra note 30; In re People (City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., Ltd.), 238 N. Y. 147,
157, 144 N. E. 484, 487 (1924).
' That the federal Constitution is no protection for the alien, see Burnet v. Brooks, 288
U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct 457 (1933) (inheritance tax imposed upon securities owned by an
alien and situated in New York), Notes (1933) 47 -ARv. L. REV. 307; (1933) 42 YALE L.
J. 1277.
' Cf. In re People (City Equitable Fire Ins. Co.), supra note 37; Matter of People
(Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), supra note 4.
"°N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 6411 (2); N. Y. INS. LAW (i9o9) § 27; Tx.
REv. CivIL CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 4759; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 193o) § 42i. For a
compilation of decisions on the various statutes, see I COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA INSURANCE LAW
(1929) § 245a, n. 5.
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well as over foreign corporations.4 ' The reason for such a holding is that the
money is looked upon as a trust fund set up at the time of the deposit for the
benefit of the local claimants, for, as is stated in People v. Granite State Provident
Association,
42
". .. It [the deposit] is in the nature of a fund held in trust for the
benefit of domestic creditors and shareholders of the defendant. The deposit
was made . . . as a condition of the defendant's right to transact business
here. The defendant corporation, in making the deposit, must be deemed to
have consented that in case of insolvency the fund might be distributed
according to the terms of the statute; that is to say, to creditors and share-
holders residing in this state. So that by the act of the corporation itself, in
availing itself of the benefits of the statute, it has devoted this fund to the
benefit of the domestic creditors and shareholders, at least so far as to enable
them to receive payment upon all their obligations in full. Therefore, the
application of the fund to their benefit in the first instance does not infringe
upon the provision of the federal constitution that citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states."
After the "trust fund" is distributed to the local claimants if the deposit was
insufficient to satisfy their claims in full, it is usually contended, when they appear
in the primary jurisdiction, that the amount they have received from the "trust
fund" should not be deducted in determining the amount of their claims on the
remaining corporate assets.43 This contention has been repudiated,44 for although
the local claimants were preferred as to such "trust fund" in the ancillary juris-
diction,4 5 when they appear in the primary court, they are placed upon an equal
footing with all other like claimants and their entire share cannot be larger than
the share obtained by other claimants of the same class. 46 Therefore, the primary
receiver, in computing the share of the funds in his hands that such claimant will
receive, must deduct the amount received from all other sources.
After the corporate assets located in the various ancillary jurisdictions have
been converted into cash, the primary receiver usually asks that the converted
" Phillips v. Perue, III Tex. 112, 129 S. W. 849 (i92I), the preference in the above
case being approved in In re Phillips (Casualty Company of America), supra note io; Lewis
v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 98 Wis. 203, 73 N. W. 793 (1898), aff'd, sub norn. Hale
v. Lewis, I81 U. S. 473, 21 Sup. Ct. 677 (9Ol). Contra: Irwin v. Granite State Provident
Ass'n, 56 N. J. Eq. 244, 38 Atl. 68a (1897), where the local creditors were permitted to re-
ceive only their pro rata share out of the special deposit. For a criticism of the procedure in
the Hale case, see Clarke v. Darr, x68 Ind. 1oI, 8o N. E. 19 (1907) ; see also Blake v. Mc-
Clung, supra note 30.
4 16I N. Y. 492, 496, 55 N. E. 1053, IO55 (19oo). See CoIUcr oF LAWs RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. 1934) Proposed Final Draft No. 5, § 2o62, Comment c.
"z Cowen v. Failey, supra note io; see People v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra
note 24, where the ancillary court refused to remit the general funds in its custody unless the
primary court would file a bond that local claimants would not have deducted from their Pro
rata share to be received in the primary court the amount received from the special deposit
in the ancillary court.
" Cowen v. Failey, supra note io; Bank Commissioners v. Granite State Provident Ass'n,
7o N. H. 557, 49 Atl. 124 (19o). In the latter case the primary court refused to file a bond
'that the claimants residing in an ancillary jurisdiction would not have deducted from their
pro rata share to be received in the primary court the amount received from the special
deposit.
Supra note 39.
See argument of court in Bank Commissioners v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra
note 44, at 561, 49 Atl. at 126. CoN-_icr oF LAws RESTArEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1934) Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 5, §§ 2067, 2068.
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assets be turned over to him for final distribution. As the local funds are com-
pletely within the control of each ancillary court, it is discretionary 4 7 whether the
fund shall be remitted or be distributed by each receiver in an independent pro-
ceeding. Inasmuch as the majority of claimants will have presented their proofs
of claim in the primary jurisdiction and most of the assets will be located there,
expediency and economy recommend that the ancillary funds be remitted. In
most instances the advantages of a central distribution are appreciated, and the
funds are turned over. Although remittance is discretionary, it has been held
that an arbitrary retention will not be permitted.4"
The desirability of remitting the various funds to the primary receiver to
obtain a single, speedy and centralized distribution is somewhat offset by the fear
of the ancillary court that claimants whose petitions were allowed only by the
ancillary receiver will be required to prove their claims anew in the primary
court,49 or that the creditors residing in the primary jurisdiction will be preferred
upon the final distribution." As an important duty of the ancillary court is the
protection of claimants residing in its jurisdiction,"' various methods have been
devised to insure a proportional and equitable distribution among all claimants.
If the funds collected by the ancillary receiver are sufficient to enable the local
creditors to receive their full pro rata share based upon a marshalling of the assets
located everywhere, their proportionate share may be retained and merely the
balance remitted.52 In this case, non-resident claimants who have presented their
petition in the ancillary court may likewise receive their full pro rata share should
there be sufficient funds to permit this.5 3 But should the fund enable only local
claimants to receive their proper share, the non-resident claimants must look else-
where for their balance.
In a few instances it has been held that even the surplus, after the payment
of all claimants who have presented their claims in the ancillary court, should not
be remitted but that the entirety should be distributed by the ancillary receiver.5
Such procedure should be followed only when there is substantial reason for such
a course as, for example, where distribution will be more quickly and efficiently
done by the ancillary receiver than by the primary receiver.
Another method frequently employed to insure recognition of local creditors
and locally approved claims in the primary proceedings is to remit only upon the
express condition that the primary receiver will agree that all claims which have
' Sands v. E. S. Greeley & Co., 88 Fed. 130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898) ; Drury v. Doherty, 127
Misc. 263, 215 N. Y. Supp. 613 (1926) ; see Barley v. Gittings, supra note 6, at 445; Brunner
v. York Bridge Co., supra note 30, at 707, 9o S. E. at 235. I CLARK, op. cit. supra note Ii,
§ 321; CONFLICr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1934) Proposed Final Draft No. 5,
§ 2o61. On the general subject of remittance of assets see Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
757. As to the discretion of the ancillary court to adjudicate proofs of claim at all or leave
that problem to the primary court, see supra note 3; Pfahler v. McCrum-Howell Co., supra
note 4, at 685.
' Southern B. & L. Ass'n v. Miller, 118 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902).
Cf. Buswell v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, supra note 26; Clark v. Painted
Post Lumber Co., supra note 5; Irwin v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 41; Drury
v. Doherty, supra note 10.
I Maynard v. Granite State Provident Assn, supra note 28; People v. Granite State
Provident Ass'n, supra note 24; Drury v. Doherty, supra note 47; see Baldwin v. Circuit
Judge, IOI Mich. 119, 134, 59 N. W. 432, 437.
" See Baldwin v. Circuit Judge, supra note 50, at 134, 59 N. W. at 437; I SMITIT,
REcrvEas (Tardy's ed. 1g2o) 977.
Brown & Co. v. Tishomingo Banking Co., 2oo Ala. 613, 76 So. 971 (1917) ; Matter of
People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), supra note 4; see Brooks v. Smith, supra note 4, at 38;
Irwin v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, suprda note 41, at 25o, 38 Atl. at 683; Brunner v.
York Bridge Co., supra note 30, at 707, 76 So. at 971.
" See Barley v. Gittings, supra note 6, at 446.
"' Drury v. Doherty, supra note 47.
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been "allowed" in the ancillary court will likewise be "allowed" in the primary
court.5 As the primary receiver usually is eager to obtain the funds, there is
generally a prompt acquiescence to any conditions placed upon the remittance.
Sometimes the ancillary court requires, as a prerequisite to remittance, the
filing of a bond by the primary receiver insuring recognition and equality in the
primary jurisdiction for claimants whose proofs of claim have been acknowledged
by the ancillary court."6 Usually the primary receiver will agree to any such
terms, but if the ancillary court imposes conditions which are too harsh, the pri-
mary receiver will decline to sign the bond,57 with the result that the ancillary
court will itself make distribution.
Recapitulation
Claimants, no matter where they reside, can present their proofs of claim in
any jurisdiction where receivership proceedings have been instituted; but the
allowance or disallowance of a claim in one jurisdiction does not affect its validity
in any other. Natural persons who have proved their claims in a court where a
receiver has been appointed are entitled, as of right under the federal Constitution,
to share pro rata in any application of the unincumbered assets in the hands of
the local receiver to the payment of claims. Corporate claimants, although not
entitled as of right under the federal Constitution to share proportionally with
resident natural persons or domestic corporations are, on the basis of comity and
of Equity's desire for impartiality, generally accorded equality. Also, it is dis-
cretionary with the ancillary court whether the fund which has been collected by
its receiver should be remitted to the primary jurisdiction, and remittance may
be conditioned on such reasonable terms as will insure local claimants recognition
and equality in the primary court.
S.F.
Buswell v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, supra note 26; Drury v. Doherty,
supra note IO; see MacMurray v. Sidwell, supra note 5, at 565, 58 N. E. at 724. Sometimes
the fund is remitted unconditionally. Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co., supra note
37; Superior Cabinet Corp. v. American Piano Co., supra note 3; see dissent in People v.
Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 24, at 498, 55 N. E. at 1055.
0 Maynard v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 28; Clark v. Painted Post Lum-
ber Co., supra note 5; Engineering Co. v. Perryman Electric Co., supfra note 26; People v.
Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 24.
u Bank Commissioners v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, supra note 44.
